G
overnment agencies are increasingly turning to private, third-party monitors to inspect and assess regulated entities' compliance with law. Third-party monitors are used to certify compliance with federal standards and other requirements in a wide array of domains, including food safety, pollution control, product safety, medical devices, and financial accounting. For example, third-party monitors assess the compliance of foreign food production facilities with Food and Drug Administration regulations, of children's products with Consumer Product Safety Commission product safety rules, of telecommunication products with Federal Communications Commission regulations, and of registered securities issuers with accounting and internal controls requirements. Several federal agencies rely on third-party monitors to assess adherence to agencies' voluntary product labeling standards, including the Department of Agriculture's National Organic Program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Energy's Energy Star Program, and the EPA's WaterSense Program. Many agencies are considering how they might deploy third-party monitoring to enhance their inspection regimes. See David Markell & Robert Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 n.c. L. Rev. 1 (2014).
The integrity of these regulatory regimes rests on the validity of the information third-party monitors provide to regulators. The challenge in designing third-party monitoring regimes is that profit-driven private monitors, typically selected and paid by the firms subject to monitoring, have incentives to downplay problems they observe in order to satisfy and retain their clients. This article discusses the most important factors that can affect the integrity of third-party monitoring and highlights key policy implications for regulators designing third-party monitoring regimes.
Risks to the Integrity of Private Third-Party Monitoring Regimes
Research demonstrates that third-party monitors are strongly inf luenced by their relationships with the firms they monitor and by economic incentives. A well-designed third-party monitoring program should address several sources of bias shown to inf luence the likelihood that third-party monitors will accurately and comprehensively identify violations and deficiencies. Below, we focus on five factors associated with auditor leniency. 
Policy Implications
This body of research suggests a number of policy implications for regulators seeking to bolster the validity of third-party monitoring regimes.
Policy Implication #1: Third-Party Monitoring Bias Can Be Mitigated by Policies That Prevent Monitors from Being Paid Directly by or Selected by Monitored Firms.
For instance, qualified monitors could be assigned by regulators or at random rather than be selected by monitored firms, and could be paid through a common fund to which all monitored entities would be required to contribute. Such Concerns arising out of longstanding monitor-client relationships can be addressed through rotation requirements, which impose term limits that require clients to change third-party monitors periodically to reduce the cognitive constraints and relational incentives that can bias their assessments. For instance, the European Union recently passed audit reform policies that will require public companies, banks, and insurance companies to change their financial auditors at least every ten years, Regulators may be able to mitigate bias and enhance the validity of third-party monitoring regimes by requiring that monitors meet specified training requirements. Regulators can also promote monitor competence and professionalism by requiring that monitors be accredited by internationally recognized standard-setting bodies. For example, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) relies on a network of national accreditation bodies to ensure that third-party monitors certifying adherence to its environmental and quality management system standards are sufficiently trained. Along the same lines, the Food and Drug Administration recently adopted a rule requiring that food safety auditors be accredited through an agencyapproved process. See Accreditation of Third-Party Certification Bodies to Conduct Food Safety Audits and to Issue Certifications, 80 Fed. Reg. 74569 (adopted Jan. 27, 2015 Another way to mitigate monitoring bias resulting from the incentives associated with business relationships is to create a set of countervailing incentives encouraging monitor independence. In Australia, for example, credit rating agencies can be held liable for basing their ratings on faulty assumptions and not altering ratings after discovering errors upon which they were issued. Some regulatory regimes and common law doctrines impose legal liability on third-party monitors for failing to identify and report legal violations at the firms they monitor. For example, the New York State Department of Financial Services has levied sanctions against financial auditors who improperly modified reports submitted to regulators after appeasing client requests to remove potentially damaging findings. Financial auditors can face sanctions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for failing to properly identify and correct accounting problems at audited firms. Food safety auditors have faced negligence suits for certifying the compliance of food producers whose products caused foodborne illnesses. See Lytton & McAllister, supra.
Conclusion
A growing body of research examines factors that risk undermining the integrity of private, third-party monitors that are inspecting and assessing entities' compliance with laws, regulations, standards, and other rules. This article highlights a number of opportunities for policy makers to better ensure that third-party monitors are themselves properly monitored to bolster the accuracy of their assessments of a wide range of regulated activities.
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